Vote security, secrecy and confidence are necessary in any electoral process. Electronic voting is one of the most valuable exploratory areas for the pursuance of a secure eGovernment transaction environment. This system is increasingly used in electoral processes ranging from specialized stand alone machines, up to complete paperless and remote voting system. Therefore this system has to follows a very complex set of security protocols. This paper analysis several algorithms to implement an electronic voting systems and discusses with a view to voter anonymity and proper protection from manipulations.
INTRODUCTION
Electronic voting promises the possibility of a convenient, efficient and secure facility for recording and tallying votes. It can be used for a variety of types of elections, from small committees or on-line communities through to full-scale national elections. The traditional process of election is quite tedious, time consuming, cumbersome because voter's come in person and vote at pre-assigned voting booth. But in era of networking and internet, we can overcome this problem by using the electronic voting system. This system is expected to make our modern social life more convenient, efficient, inexpensive and without disturbing the daily routine life. More potentially secure system could be implemented, based on formal protocols that specify the messages sent between the voters and administrators. Such protocols have been studied for several decades aiming to provide security properties, which go beyond those that can be achieved by paperbased voting systems. Generally, any e-Voting systems consist of six [Triinu 2007 ] main phases such as ( figure 1), also known as iii. The voting and vote's saving -is a phase where eligible voters cast votes and eVoting system saves the received votes from voters. iv. The votes' managing -is a phase in which votes are managed, sorted and prepared for counting. v. The votes' counting -is the phase to decrypt and count the votes and to output the final tally. vi. The auditing -is a phase to check that eligible voters were capable to vote and their votes participate in the computation of final tally.
ALGEBRAIC FORMATION OF E-VOTING REQUIREMENTS
The minimum requirements that every outline of electronic voting should satisfy are the followings [Cabello et. al. 2007 Authority of authentication: 1 U . It is a third trusted party whose mission is to authenticate the registered voters and to provide them of the necessary tools to emit their vote in a proper way. iv.
Authority of collection: 2 U . It is a third trusted party responsible for collecting votes, to verify its validity, to store them and finally to carry out the recount of them. It is, therefore, the only entity that has permission for the deciphered of the votes.
ALGEBRAIC FORMATION OF E-VOTING PROTOCOLS
i. The authority of certification 0 U emits a digital certificate to each one of the legal registered voters. ii. Each voter i V is identified by the authority of authentication 1 U , which validates its digital certificate and sends a random sequence of bits U his/her vote signed by ) ( :
viii. The authority 0 U computes:
and sends it to the authority 2 U . ix. The authority computes:
and sends it to the authority 2 U . x.
The authority 2 U verifies the validity of the different votes deciphering ) ( ),.....,
The authority 2 U computes:
The authority 2 U calculates the number of votes obtained by option 1 simply computing the Hamming distance of bit sequences v and B. That is:
Number of votes of option 1: 
E-VOTING ALGORITHM
Several algorithms for electronic voting have been developed and we here describe the following algorithms such as Mixnet, Homomorphic and Blind signature. A new E-voting system using the way of cloud technology [Pankaj 2014] is highly secure secured for identifying the voter but this system is very expensive because the system is not established one server of E-voting system rather than this system is installing many servers of the Evoting system over various geographical locations of India.
Algorithm for Mixnets Based e-Voting
Chaum [Chaum 1981 ] introduces the concept of a mix-net that is built up from several linked servers called mixes. Each mix randomizes input messages and outputs the permutation of them, such that the input and output messages are not linkable to each other. This approach is very easy to understand because the sequence of cryptographic building blocks closely resembles how a classic paper based voting occurs too. Several steps of this approach are described below (figure 2):
The voter prepares the plaintext ballot and encrypts it so that only he himself is able to decrypt it. He also calculates so called zero-knowledge [Goldwasser et The voter now encrypts the vote with the public key used for the elections. He then sends the vote through an anonymizing mix-net. This would be a network of independently operated computers, each of which will somehow shuffle the incoming votes and then send them in a different order to the next node in the mix-net. Each link in the mix-net could also include its own encryption-decryption, on top of the encryption the voter already applied to the plaintext vote. . We describe them below.
Decryption mixnet/ Re-encryption mixnet
Let K i be the public key of the ith stage. Let the sender of the mixnet be a voter and the receiver be an authority, in a voting scheme. A sender V j concatenates a message m j with a random string r j as (m j ||r j ), then encrypts as,
and broadcasts it
Mix i with private key
Another decryption algorithm is developed by Swaminathan [Swaminathan et. al. 2012] However, the mixnet algorithm can be described as follows [Krishna et. al. 2006 ](figure 3):
; j = 1, …, n. For i = 1, …, l. For j = 1, …, n.
Step 1:
Step 2:
Lexicographically order all decrypted quantities obtained in Step 1.
Output :
R j m } { , a batch of mixed messages that cannot be traced back to senders.
Algorithm for Homomorphic e-Voting
The homomorphic encryption was proposed by Cramer [Cramer et al. 1997] and it takes advantage of the characteristic properties of the homomorphic encryption to provide verifiability to the electronic vote schemes without contributing any information on the individual votes. Homomorphism is an algebraic property particularly useful in electronic voting schemes because it allows applying operations on sets of encrypted ballots without need of decrypting them [Laure et. al.] . In electronic voting schemes, this notion is used as follows: Let M is a plain-texts groups and C be a cipher-texts group. Then, we say that the encryption scheme is (  ,  )-homomorphic if for any instance E of the encryption scheme, given 1 The voter prepares a plaintext ballot and encrypts it with a homomorphic encryption algorithm. He also provides zero-knowledge proofs that the contents of the encrypted ballot are a valid ballot. He also signs the ballot, identifying himself. ii.
The encrypted vote, the proofs and the signature are all posted on a public, non-erasable bulletin board. Therefore the verifiability of this approach seems to be well taken care of. iii.
After voting has closed, the voting authorities will multiply all votes with each other. Again this happens in public, and of course anyone could do the same multiplication. iv.
The voting authority then takes the result of the multiplication and decrypts that. Individual votes are never decrypted. v.
Anyone can see the result. Anyone can also verify that the result is the plaintext of the encrypted result.
Algorithm for Blind Signature e-Voting
The concept of blind signatures was first introduced by Chaum [Chaum 1982 ] to design the first e-case protocols. Later, they were used by Fujioka [Fujioka et. al. 1993] . A voting authority authenticates a message, usually an encrypted vote, without knowing the contents. Even if later the (un-blinded) signature is made public, it is impossible to connect the signature to the signing process, i.e. to the voter. Schemes based on blind signatures usually use anonymous channels in order to send the un-blinded signature and the encryption of the ballot to a voting authority, assuring the anonymity of the sender. Blind signature is often used to get a token from the authority [Fujioka Atsushi et.al. 1992] . The voter gets a signature from the authority of his ballot and then he is able to cast his ballot. It is used to achieve eligibility.
Blind Signature
A blind signature allows somebody for instance an authority to sign an encrypted message without decrypting it. Once the message signed and resent to the sender, he has a signed version of his vote by the authority and a guarantee that his vote has not been seen - is a polynomial-time signature-verifying algorithm that on input a message signature pair (m,s) and the public key pk outputs either yes or no.
CONCLUSION
There are some potential weaknesses in mixnet algorithm such as how do we know that the nodes in the mix-net don't cheat. They could for example drop some votes and don't forward them. Since we know the total amount of votes cast, the voting authority would see that some votes are missing. The corrupt nodes could then also duplicate the same amount of votes to make the total match. Still, what if there are votes missing? Who would we blame? Therefore, the nodes in the mix-net are required to publish some mathematical proofs that verify that they forwarded all messages correctly, without of course revealing how exactly they shuffled the messages. Such proofs make the process more verifiable. But still, some robustness issues remain in these schemes. On the other hand, the homomorphic algorithm approaches the universal verifiability and robustness aspects. There's no mixing and shuffling and hidden channels going on, rather everything happens in public, but without compromising the privacy of an individual voter. The main drawback in these schemes is that the algorithm will restrict the format of the plaintext ballot. Typically it can only be a number, or some kind of a bitmap.
